Post Keynesians advocate two distinct approaches to monetary and interest rate policy. The activist approach sees interest rates moved counter cyclically to ensure strong growth and low employment. The parking-it approach, however, favors setting real or nominal rates at specific levels and changing them only sparingly. In this paper, the authors evaluate the impact on macroeconomic performance of three variants of this latter approach -the Smithin Rule, the Kansas City Rule and the Pasinetti Rule.
In neoclassical theory, the equilibrium interest rate is governed by the equality between savings and investment, that is, by the supply and demand for loanable funds. This natural or Wicksellian rate is different from the market rate of interest, which is determined in the money market or by central banks. The purpose of monetary policy in this context is to set market rates (or set the growth of the money supply, provided money demand is stable) so as to ensure equality between the market and the natural rates of interest. Otherwise, any discrepancy between the two rates will create instability, as in Wicksell's process of cumulative inflation.
Under the guise of the New Consensus, the modern-day reincarnation of orthodox or Wicksellian theory, the central bank sets the money rate according to its policy objective, usually an inflation target. Provided equilibrium is maintained and there is no inflation, the market and natural rates of interest are equalized. But any discrepancy between these rates will unleash forces of instability. In this sense, in the short-run, the central bank has no choice but to pursue counter-cyclical interest rate policy in order to restore equilibrium.
The orthodox story, however, rests on a number of key assumptions, all explicit in the New Consensus. First, it assumes that inflation is either a monetary and excess aggregate demand phenomenon; second, there is a direct and predictable causal relationship between interest rates and aggregate demand, via the investment function; third, there exists a natural rate of interest, independent of monetary forces, towards which the actual rate tends to gravitate.
For post-Keynesians, however, the story is vastly different. First, inflation is primarily cost-determined and, more specifically, the result of conflicting claims over income and wealth. This is more apparent in heterodox approaches such as the monetary circuit, which emphasizes a social hierarchy between agents or macro-groups involved in the production process. Second, the interest elasticity of investment is small and/or unpredictable. This conclusion renders invalid the notion that aggregate demand can be fine tuned by means of monetary policy. Finally, as Smithin (1994 Smithin ( , 2007 Lavoie, 1996 Lavoie, , 2006 Palley, 1996 Palley, , 2006 Rochon, 2005 Rochon, , 2007 Setterfield, 2004 Setterfield, , 2006b ). In our own contribution to these debates (Rochon and Setterfield, 2007) , we identified and summarized two distinct post-Keynesian views on the use of monetary policy. The first view, which we called the 'activist rule', advocates the use of counter-cyclical interest rate policy to fine-tune economic outcomes and regulate business cycles. Proponents of this approach claim that interest rate policies can be an effective tool for regulating aggregate demand and unemployment (see Moore, 1988; Palley, 1996; Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2006; Fontana, 2007) .
The second view, however, argues that monetary policy is not a reliable tool for regulating aggregate output. Arguing against monetary policy dominance, this second view proposes 'parking' interest rates at a given level, and relying instead on fiscal policy to achieve macroeconomic objectives related to the level of economic activity (see Smithin, 2007; Wray, 2007; Lavoie and Seccareccia, 1999) .
1 As Godley and Lavoie (2007) argue, "Fiscal policy is quite capable of achieving full employment at some target inflation rate. It is not clear what advantage monetary policy has, besides the fact that target interest rates can be easily altered every month or even every week. Indeed, by bringing back fiscal policy as the main tool to affect aggregate demand, monetary policy would now have an additional degree of freedom to set the real interest rate, which is a key determinant of distribution policy."
Three prominent variations of the parking-it view can be identified (Rochon and Setterfield, 2007) . According to the Smithin Rule, the central bank should keep real interest rates very low, close to zero. The Kansas City Rule, meanwhile, recommends that nominal rates be set at zero: "In the modern floating exchange rate economy, this [the euthanasia of the rentier] is done by setting the overnight interest rate at zero, with other rates established above this to reward risk-taking" (Wray, 2007, this issue) . Both of these rules thus propose keeping real or nominal rates close to zero in order to redistribute income away from rentiers, in the tradition of Keynes's famous 'Euthanasia of the Rentier'. The Fair Rate Rule (also referred to as the Pasinetti Rule), however, recommends setting the real rate equal to the rate of growth of labour productivity, following Pasinetti, seeing rentiers as a 'necessary evil' (Lavoie, 1996, p. 537) . In this case, monetary policy is essentially neutral with respect to the distribution of income.
According to Pasinetti (1981, p, 174) , the fair rate of interest "stems from the principle that all individuals, when they engage in debt/credit relations, should obtain, at any time, an amount of purchasing power that is constant in terms of labour (a labour theory of income distribution)." For Lavoie (1999, p. 4) , "The fair rate of interest thus maintains the purchasing power, in terms of command over labour hours, of funds that are borrowed or lent, and preserves the intertemporal distribution of income between borrowers and lenders. The fair rate of interest, in real terms, should be equal to the rate of increase in the productivity of the total amount of labour that is required, directly or indirectly, to produce consumption goods and to increase productive capacity. … In an economy where the rate of profit remains constant, this growth rate would simply equal the growth rate of real wages. With price inflation, the fair rate of interest would be equal to the average rate of wage inflation, i.e., the growth rate of overall productivity plus the rate of price inflation."
In this paper, we further explore the three parking-it rules identified above and model the macroeconomic implications of each rule. As intimated above, the three different rules have different implications for the position of the rentier class in society. In this sense, the three rules have important and different distributional implications. In this paper, however, we are interested in exploring the implications of these rules for other macroeconomic outcomes, together with their effects on the capacity of the authorities to pursue non-distributional policy objectives using non-monetary policy interventions. In other words, we introduce a new criteria by which to evaluate the relative merits of the three rules -an exercise that, in turn, will hopefully contribute to the process by which 
A Positive Post-Keynesian Contribution to Monetary Policy Analysis
In contrast to orthodox theory, post-Keynesian policy rests on the following claims about the economic and monetary process:
1) The economy is a circuit of complex interactions between 'macro-groups', such as workers, firms, banks, and the State (we can also add a foreign sector), within a distinct hierarchy. Each group has a specific function and role (Lavoie, 1987) . While they all have their respective place within the hierarchy, the realization of their ultimate objective (be it profits or growth for firms and banks, or wages for workers), depends on the behaviour of other groups. For instance, in order to receive remuneration, workers must depend on firms, whose animal spirits or expectations of aggregate demand will shape their production decisions. Yet, in turn, to realize their production and growth objectives, firms must secure the proper funding from the banking system; only then can they remunerate workers. The decision of banks to lend will also depend on their expectations of aggregate demand and how this will affect the revenues of firms, which ultimately depend on the decisions of households to part with their wages (see Rochon, 2006; Lavoie, 1987) . But banks cannot lend without firms willingly agreeing to enter into debt.
These interactions, and the co-dependence of objectives, will inevitably lead to conflict within the sphere of production.
2) The nominal (and real) rate of interest is an exogenous variable. It is not determined in the money market, but rather by the central bank in accordance with its own objectives.
The purpose of interest rates is neither to equilibrate the money market nor the market for loanable funds; rather, the interest rate is a distributive variable (Rogers, 1989) . As Lavoie (1996, p. 536) explains, "the rate of interest is an important determinant of the distribution of income between social classes and presumably between individuals." For any given level of income, any increase in the rate of interest will increase the income share of rentiers, to the detriment of workers and firms.
3) The money supply is endogenous, determined in the loans market, as firms borrow credit from banks to finance their production Moore, 1988; Rochon, 1999) . This endogeneity is 'natural', in the sense that it is not a policy choice of central banks, as in New Consensus models. In the latter, the money supply is made endogenous because of the instability of the demand for money. For post-Keynesians, however, money's endogeneity is the result of the production process itself and the need to finance production plans: it is the result of debt. In this sense, credit and money are distinct from one another: credit creates money.
4) The economy is demand-determined, both in the short run and the long run. There exists no supply-determined equilibrium determined independently of demand conditions towards which the economy automatically gravitates. Rather, supply adjusts to demand via changes in resource utilization rates and demand-induced variations in the (Harrodian) natural rate of growth.
5) There is no simple or predictable relationship between interest rates and inflation. In orthodox models, as the rate of interest increases and output slows, inflation also diminishes in the short-run, as depicted by the standard Philips Curve, as inflation is typically determined by demand. Yet, for post-Keynesians, and heterodox economists in general, the relationship between interest rates and inflation is less clear cut. In fact,
initially, higher interest rates may actually contribute to higher inflation (Lavoie (1996) .
For instance, consider the rate of interest as a cost of production. Higher rates mean higher costs, which can then be passed on in the form of higher prices. In these circumstances, there is a positive relationship between interest rates and prices, not a negative relationship as stipulated in orthodox theory. With higher prices, real wages fall, which may encourage workers to demand higher wages. This highlights the potential for conflict over income shares: inflation is first and foremost the result of conflict over the distribution of income 7) Even though post-Keynesians are skeptical about the interest-elasticity of investment spending, interest rates do matter: they can have sustained effects on macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment and growth, when set too high. First, unlike orthodox economists, post-Keynesians argue that the relationship between interest rates and output works through the credit market and, as such, is complex. Second, when central banks adopt austerity policies, successive increases in the rate of interest can eventually cause economic contraction. Finally, as interest rates persistently increase, economic contraction will reduce the bargaining power of workers. As a result, the rate of increase of prices will diminish, thereby limiting inflationary pressures.
Given the discussion above, several conclusions can be reached, which are paramount to a proper development of economic policy. If policy is drawn inevitably from the theoretical foundation upon which it is built, it stands to reason that post-Keynesians will reach very different policy prescriptions than their orthodox counterparts. Indeed, the first policy conclusion is that post-Keynesians do not believe that monetary policy is the "only game in town" (see Lavoie, 2007, this volume) . In New Consensus models, fiscal policy has essentially disappeared, replaced by exclusive reliance on monetary policy. It is this vision that we label as 'monetary policy dominance' -a departure from even "old Keynesian" policies, which attributed to fiscal policy a pivotal role, at least in the short run (see also Wray, 2006, p. 5) . 
A Post-Keynesian Monetary Macroeconomic Model
In this section, we outline the four main components of the structural model that we will use (in the next section) to compare and contrast the macroeconomic consequences of the various Post Keynesian interest rate rules mentioned above. The model builds on, extends and develops in greater detail some of the key features of the model in Rochon and Setterfield (2007) .
Inflation and the distribution of income
We model inflation as a conflicting claims process. 3 Specifically, we write:
where w is the rate of growth of nominal wages, ω W is the target wage share of workers, ω is the actual wage share, q is the rate of growth of labour productivity, p e and p denote the expected and actual rates of inflation, respectively, ω F is the target wage share of firms, μ denotes the relative power of workers in the wage bargain, g is the rate of growth and φ is a reflection of the "monopoly power" of firms vis-a-vis the goods market (specifically, their ability to increase prices in excess of increases in unit labour costs).
Equation [1] describes the rate of growth of nominal wages as increasing in the rates of productivity growth and expected inflation, and the difference between workers' target wage share and the actual wage share (the former representing the distributional aspirations of workers which, at any given level of productivity, can be associated with a perceived "fair" value of the real wage).
bargaining power of workers vis-a-vis firms in the wage bargain, and the "monopoly power" of firms in product markets. Finally, equation [3] allows worker bargaining power to vary directly with the rate of growth, the latter serving as a proxy for the general state of the economy.
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Given the rates of growth of output and productivity, equilibrium will occur in the model above when p = p e and ω ω = which, from the definition of the wage share, implies that p = w -q. Using the second of these equilibrium conditions in conjunction with [2], we arrive at:
where in [4] (and hereafter), an asterisk (*) denotes the equilibrium value of the variable.
Meanwhile, using both of our equilibrium conditions together with the result in 
Economic growth
Our description of economic growth is based on a neo-Kaleckian model of the form:
where u is the rate of capacity utilization, r is the gross rate of profit, i is the nominal interest rate, λ is the ratio of corporate debt to the aggregate capital stock (assumed constant in the short run), g s is the rate of growth of savings, v is the (fixed) capitaloutput ratio and g is as previously defined. Equation [6] describes growth as increasing in the rates of capacity utilization and "enterprise" profits -that is, gross profits minus the amount paid by firms (to rentiers) to service outstanding debts. 
Note that an economically meaningful solution to [9] (that is where u * > 0), now requires Substituting [9] into [6] and solving for the equilibrium rate of growth, we arrive at:
It should be noted that it follows from [9] and [10] that:
and: 
Technical progress
We model technical progress as:
The process of technical progress is thus conceived as follows. First, captures a
Marx effect: increasing the wage share and thereby, ceteris paribus, squeezing profits encourages labour-saving technical change by firms in an effort to restore profitability.
Second, captures a Verdoorn effect where increased growth results in dynamic increasing returns.
Linearizing this technical progress function and evaluating the resulting expression at the equilibrium wage share and rate of growth, we arrive at: It follows that the equilibrium nominal interest rate can be written as:
Model solution and comparative statics
In order to proceed with the solution of the model outlined above, we now make two simplifying assumptions. First, we replace [3] with:
In other words, following Palley (1996) , we now have a model in which both the wage share targets ω W and ω F and the monopoly/bargaining power of firms/workers are exogenous to the level of activity. We can now find the general equilibrium rates of growth, inflation and interest that emerge from the interaction of the equations listed above, under various different assumptions about the size of the parameters β p and β q . We begin by substituting [13] into [10], which yields: 
where denotes the rate of productivity growth consistent with the equilibrium rate of inflation in [5']. We now assume that: * * * * 1 p dq dq dp dp > − = and: show the derivation of the general equilibrium interest rate i′. In this way, Figure 1 illustrates the derivation of the general equilibrium rates of growth, inflation and interest from the structural model summarized at the start of this section.
[
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE]
Of course, Figure 1 does not faithfully represent any of the monetary policy regimes described in the previous section, all of which involve specific values of the parameters β p and β q . But we are now in a position to introduce specific values of these parameters - 
(1 [
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE]
As is clear from Figure 2 , the interest rate is always higher under the Pasinetti rule.
Figure 2 also suggests that growth will be higher and inflation will be lower with the Smithin rule. This makes a certain amount of intuitive sense. Since the Smithin rule involves a lower interest rate ceteris paribus, it will stimulate growth and, as a result, lower inflation. 14 However, some caution is needed when interpreting the result shown in Figure 2 . This is because as inflation rises, the interest rate rises and the rate of growth falls faster with the Smithin rule; with the Pasinetti rule, rising inflation pushes up the interest rate depressing the rate of growth which, in turn, ameliorates the increase in interest rates and their negative effect on the growth rate. This is the substance of the steeper growth frontier that arises in the case of the Smithin rule. The upshot of all this, as illustrated in Figure 3 , is that if the inflation frontier is displaced sufficiently far to the right -if, for example, the "aspiration gap" between workers and firms, ω W -ω F , is sufficiently large -then growth will be higher and inflation will be lower with the Pasinetti rule.
[FIGURE 3 GOES HERE]
In short, the Pasinetti rule is the "high growth, low inflation" monetary policy rule in an inflation-prone economy (in which the inflation frontier is displaced further to the right, as in Figure 3 ), whereas the Smithin rule plays the same role in an intrinsically low inflation environment (i.e., one in which the inflation frontier is displaced further to the left, as in Figure 2 ). This last result suggests that we can have "co-operative" or "conflictive" monetary policy regimes as a result of the choice between the Pasinetti and Smithin rules. For example, suppose that we are dealing with an inflation-prone economy in which the inflation frontier is displaced to the right, with the result that the Pasinetti rule is the "high growth, low inflation" monetary policy rule (as in Figure 3) . If the distributional purpose of monetary policy is to maintain the rentier class, then we have a co-operative monetary policy regime: both the distributional purpose of monetary policy and the maintenance of high growth and low inflation require use of the Pasinetti rule.
However, if the distributional purpose of monetary policy is to euthanize the rentier, then
we have a conflictive monetary policy regime. This time, the various objectives of policy makers regarding the distribution of income and the rates of growth and inflation call for the use of different IROPs -the first purpose being better served by the Smithin rule, the second by the Pasinetti rule.
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We now turn to consider the Kansas City rule. This stipulates that β p = β q = 0 which, upon substitution into [15] , yields:
with: * * 0 KC dq dp = With the Kansas City rule, then, the growth frontier becomes horizontal -equilibrium productivity growth is constant at the rate that would emerge from [15"] with p = 0, regardless of the rate of inflation. As a result of this, the Kansas City rule always yields the highest rate of growth and the lowest rate of inflation, regardless of the position of the inflation frontier. 17 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. By minimizing the value of the nominal interest rate, the Kansas City rule results in higher growth and hence lower inflation than either the Pasinetti or Smithin rules, both of which give rise to higher interest rate regimes. Moreover, this result is unaffected by the exact inflation costs of any given rate of productivity growth (i.e., the position of the inflation frontier), since under the Kansas City rule, the rate of interest and hence the rate of productivity growth is invariant with respect to the rate of inflation. These results are illustrated in Figure 4 below, which compares the macroeconomic consequences of the Pasinetti, Smithin and Kansas City rules in the context of an inflation-prone economy.
Non-monetary policy interventions
The question that we now turn to consider is: how do the models in the previous subsection, featuring the various different IROPs that can be derived from equation We begin by considering the impact of a fiscal policy designed to stimulate growth.
Referring back to the description of the growth process in equations [6]-[8], if we
define γ in equation [6] as the ratio of the government budget deficit to the aggregate capital stock, then the fiscal policy we are contemplating can be captured as dγ > 0.
Inspection of the generic growth frontier in [15] reveals that γ is a determinant of the intercept but not the slope of this frontier in q, p space. Recall that we have already defined the intercept term of this generic growth frontier as:
( 1 ) (
It follows that:
Note that the result immediately above holds regardless of the value of β q (given the familiar neo-Kaleckian condition for an economically meaningfully solution to equation
[9], as stated earlier). In other words, regardless of the precise form of the IROP, a fiscal stimulus dγ > 0 will always displace the growth frontier in Figure 1 in such a way as to raise growth (and hence reduce inflation). Note, however, that:
(
In other words, the size of the derivative / d dγ Ψ will be greater when β q = 0 (as in the case of the Smithin and Kansas City rules) than it will be when β q = 1 (as in the case of the Pasinetti rule). This means that the marginal impact of fiscal policy on growth will be greater when monetary policy is conducted in accordance with the Smithin or Kansas City rules than it will be when monetary policy is conducted in accordance with the Pasinetti rule. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. With either the Smithin or Kansas City rules, the interest rate is invariant with respect to changes in productivity growth (β q = 0 in [13] ). However, with the Pasinetti rule, β q = 1, as a result of which a fiscal stimulus that raises growth will cause an increase in the interest rate which will decrease the rate of growth. In short, there is partial crowding out of fiscal policy, brought about by the behaviour of the interest rate, that is unique to the Pasinetti rule, as a result of which the growth bonus that results from a fiscal stimulus dγ > 0 of any given size will be reduced if monetary policy is conducted in accordance with this rule.
Consider now the conduct of an incomes policy designed to curb inflation. Referring back to the structure of the inflation process summarized in equation [5'], it is clear that an incomes policy designed to reduce the rate of inflation at any given rate growth can act on any (or some combination) of the parameters Ω, ω W , or ω F . In what follows, we will consider an incomes policy of the form dΩ < 0. Note that, although Ω varies directly with the relative power of labour in the wage bargain, this type of incomes policy need not involve "zapping labour". Hence although dΩ < 0 could be achieved by essentially coercive means (by limiting the ability of workers to bargain collectively, for example, or by increasing workers sense of employment and income insecurity -on which, see Setterfield (2006a Setterfield ( , 2006c ), it could also be achieved co-operatively. Hence workers might agree to deliberately forego the use of what then becomes a latent degree of bargaining power as a result of their participation in a "social bargain" or "limited capital-labour accord" of the type described by Cornwall (1990) and Bowles et al (1990) .
Consider, then, the impact of dΩ < 0 on [5"]. It follows from this last equation that:
Interpreted literally, this result states that an incomes policy that reduces Ω will decrease the rate of productivity growth necessary to achieve any given rate of inflation. Or in other words, inflation will now be lower at any given rate of productivity growth: the incomes policy will shift the inflation frontier first depicted in Figure 1 to the left.
It is clear from equation [15] that the growth frontier is invariant with respect to the value of Ω, regardless of the precise form of the IROP. Intuitively, then, the effect of dΩ < 0 will depend chiefly on the slope of the growth frontier, something that is dependent on the form of the IROP. This is illustrated in Figure 5 below.
[FIGURE 5 GOES HERE] Figure 5 illustrates the marginal impact of an incomes policy on growth and inflation outcomes for all three of the monetary policy regimes discussed above. 19 This is because reducing inflation will automatically reduce the rate of interest under these rules, and thus boost growth. Per the results of the exercise in Figure 5 , we can see that the growthenhancing effects of inflation targeting will be greater under the Smithin rule than they will be under the Pasinetti rule. Second, a successful incomes policy can trigger a switch in the "high growth, low inflation" monetary policy rule. This is illustrated in Figure 5 , wherein the Pasinetti rule is the "high growth, low inflation" rule initially, but the shift in the inflation frontier causes the Smithin rule to become the "high growth, low inflation" rule subsequently. This, in turn, means that an incomes policy such as that depicted in 2. Needless to say, the model developed below by no means exhausts the process of evaluation. For example, it does not capture the potential impact of the three interest rate rules on corporate finance -in particular, the extent to which firms rely on either debt or new equity to finance investment, and the effects of this on economic growth. We leave this and other extensions of the type of assessment exercise undertaken in this paper to future research.
3.
See Lavoie (1992, chpt.7) and Burdekin and Burkett (1996) for surveys of the conflicting-claims approach to the analysis of inflation.
4.
See Setterfield (2006a) for further discussion of both this equation and other features of the specific conflicting-claims model stated above.
5.
A better proxy in this case would no doubt be the employment rate, but this issue need not detain us here since as will become clear in the next section, we ultimately assume that worker bargaining power is exogenous when solving for the general equilibrium solution of our complete model.
6.
See Blecker (2002) for a survey of neo-Kaleckian growth theory.
7.
See Hein (2006) and Setterfield (2006b) for further discussion of equation [6] .
8.
Note that the analysis here (and in what follows) assumes that there is some interest elasticity of investment behaviour, our earlier remarks regarding post-Keynesian skepticism about the size (and even the structural stability) of this elasticity notwithstanding. Note also that, given λ, enterprise profits in equation [6] are sensitive to variations in the gross rate of profit in real terms (r) and the nominal rate of interest (i). To see this, begin by writing:
where П E denotes enterprise profits, П denotes gross profits and П R denotes payments to rentiers (all in nominal terms). Suppose further that П R = iD, where D is the nominal stock of debt. We can therefore write:
Dividing through by the nominal value of the capital stock (PK) yields:
which we can write as:
where r e denotes the real rate of enterprise profits. So what equation [6] states is that the rate of growth depends on the real rate of enterprise profits, but this, in turn, is affected by the nominal interest rate. Intuitively, this is because it is increases in the nominal interest rate that squeeze firms' cash flows (by redistributing income towards rentiers) and hence impede their ability to accumulate. Of course, this in an intrinsically Keynesian result, since it involves a monetary variable affecting a real variable.
9.
See, for example, Foley (2003, chpt.2) and McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) , chpt.2) for discussion of the Marx and Verdoorn effects, respectively.
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. This is only a possibility, of course, as long as 0 g α < .
11.
This means that it is impossible for the policy authorities to influence the equilibrium rate of inflation using the "traditional" lever of deflationary monetary policy. However, this, in and of itself, involves no loss of generality in what follows, since as is clear from the discussion in section (iv) above, we are not interested in specifying monetary policy reaction functions that aim to deflate the economy in the pursuit of lower inflation.
12.
Recall that the equilibrium wage share, as determined in equation [4] , has already been incorporated into the equations above.
13.
As discussed by Rochon and Setterfield (2007) , the three different IROPs described in the previous section have different implications for the position of the rentier class in society, with the Horizontalist rule defining a "fair" return for rentiers and the other two rules seeking the euthanasia of the rentier. Thus we already know that the three rules have different distributional implications. We are now looking to see whether they have different effects on growth and inflation outcomes, and on the capacity of the authorities to pursue other policy objectives using non-monetary policy interventions. In other words, we are introducing a second criteria by which to evaluate the merits of three rules -something that, in turn, will hopefully contribute to the process by which Post Keynesians make an informed choice between the three rules when confronting the "Smithin question" (in the absence of a Wicksellian natural rate, exactly what, according to PKE, should the long run/equilibrium rate of interest be?)
14.
Note that faster growth will unambiguously reduce inflation because of the fact that the bargaining/monopoly power of workers/firms and the wage share targets ω W and ω F have all been assumed to be exogenous, whilst higher productivity growth reduces the rate of growth of unit labour costs. Were we, for example, to assume the bargaining power and/or wage share target of workers vary directly with the rate of growth, it is possible that faster growth would ultimately lead to higher rather than lower inflation. Note that this would, in turn, lead to a partial crowding out of the growth bonus associated with a switch to the Smithin rule, since higher inflation would promote an increase in the interest rate which would reduce the rate of growth. (This would necessarily be a partial crowding out effect, of course, since the rise in the interest rate is predicated on a higher rate of inflation which requires an increase in the growth rate.) In short, relaxing the assumed exogeneity of bargaining power, monopoly power and wage share targets has the capacity to modify the sign of the effect on inflation but only the size of the effect on growth of switching from the Horizontalist to the Smithin interest rate rule.
15.
Once again, relaxing the assumed exogeneity of bargaining power, monopoly power and wage share targets has the capacity to modify the sign of the effect on inflation but only the size of the effect on growth of switching from the Smithin to the Horizontalist interest rate rule in an inflation-prone economy.
16.
Of course, the same distinction between conflictive and co-operative monetary policy regimes can arise in the intrinsically low inflation environment depicted in Figure 2 .
17. This time, relaxing the assumed exogeneity of bargaining power, monopoly power and wage share targets has the capacity to modify the sign of the effect on inflation of switching from the Horizontalist o Smithin rules to the Kansas City interest rate rule, but will not affect even the size of the effect on growth of this switch. This is for the simple reason that, with the Kansas City rule, there is no negative feedback from inflation to the rate of growth operating via the rate of interest (which is constant), and hence no partial crowding-out effect.
18.
The impact on the interest rate is omitted for the sake of simplicity.
19.
It should be noted that by "inflation targeting", we mean only the credible commitment of the policy authorities to achieving a clearly stated target rate of inflation. Our definition of inflation targeting is thus more general than that associated with authors such as Mishkin (2002, p.361) , for whom it also has specific implications for monetary policy and for the policy priorities of the central bank. 
